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Motivation 
With the increasing desire also of private individuals to access their confidential data even from their mobile devices, the 
need for strong security controls for such application arises – in the same way as it has years ago in the area of web appli-
cations. This paper covers one of the most important parts thereof: the login process that allows an application on a mo-
bile device accessing data from a server using two-factor authentication. 
Introduction 
An increasing number of internet-based end-customer applications require two-factor authentication. Text message (SMS) 
based one-time code distribution (as second factor) is rapidly becoming the most popular choice when strong authentica-
tion is needed, for example in e-banking. Low acquisition, distribution and help-desk cost are the main drivers for these so-
called mTAN1 based authentication methods. All of these properties are particularly important for applications that serve 
large number of users, possibly on a global scale. 
With multi-factor authentication, each token available for authenticating the user falls into one of the following three cate-
gories: 
• Something the user knows (e.g. a password) 
• Something the user has (e.g. a hardware token) 
• Something the user is (e.g. a fingerprint) 
mTAN-based strong authentication makes use of the two categories “something the user knows” (password) and “some-
thing the user has” (mobile device). During authentication, the user has to provide the password as well as a one-time 
secret received by SMS on his mobile phone. Proof of possession of the mobile phone (which is done by providing the 
received SMS code) is used as 2nd login factor.   
With increased capabilities of mobile devices, there’s been a trend towards accessing web services2 over the mobile chan-
nel3 as well. Much like a regular web-user also users that access the service via a mobile application must be authenticated 
with a mechanism that sports the required strength against identified, relevant threats.  However simply transferring the 
mTAN-approach to mobile app development doesn’t work well, mainly because it would be cumbersome or even impos-
sible to be used on the mobile device as it requires the user to switch between applications4. As a result, we have to 
come up with an authentication scheme that is better suited for mobile apps, which should provide security comparable 
to the two-factor authentication mechanism described above.  
In this paper, we propose a strong and practical two-factor authentication scheme for smart phones that does not nega-
tively affect the user’s experience or usability and that provides security comparable to “classic” two-factor authentication 
schemes. 
 
 
                                                 
1 mobile Transaction Authentication Number 
2 Also such implementing two-factor authentication 
3 E.g. as an iPhone app 
4  Mobile app and SMS inbox 
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Technical Approach 
mTAN is based on a simple principle: Once a user has securely proven possession of his mobile phone5, it can be used as 
the second login factor. While mTAN uses a unique SMS code that is generated on the server and received during each 
login attempt, our approach makes use of the “principle of key continuity” (also called “Baby Duck / Duckling”-model) to 
negotiate a token that is used as the second login factor. This model was already successfully implemented in protocols 
such as SSH or products such as Phil Zimmerman’s zFone. The idea behind this approach is that if we can securely authen-
ticate one session (usually the first one) and derive a shared secret, this secret can be re-used to authenticate later ses-
sions – i.e. each secret Sn6 directly depends the previous secret Sn-1.  
Assuming the shared secret Sn-1 can be stored securely on the mobile device, the second login factor (i.e. the next shared 
secret, Sn) can only be generated by the mobile device itself. It is therefore dependent on something the user “has”. From 
a security point of view, this is very similar to mTAN but offers much better usability when using a mobile app. 
More detailed, the approach works as follows: Before a new session n is initiated, the mobile device has stored a shared 
secret Sn-1 from the previous session n-1. Sn-1 is then used to compute the shared secret to authenticate the new ses-
sion using the following formula: Sn = f(<shared secret7>, Sn-1). As long as the token Sn-1 is adequately se-
cured on the mobile device, proving knowledge of it is sufficient for a second login factor (which the client does by calcu-
lating and providing Sn). A normal login therefore works as follows:  
Cl ient Server 
(looks up Sn-1)  (looks up Sn-1) 
(computes Sn = f(<shared secret>, Sn-1)  (computes Sn = f(<shared secret>, Sn-1) 
 Sn  
  (checks Sn == Sn) 
  OK 
(stores Sn)  (stores Sn) 
 
Missing in the above flow is the mobile device initialization, which also has to be done in a secure manner. In our reference 
implementation (see page 4), we have decided to use an mTAN code once, to initialize the mobile device. The first secret 
S1 is therefore referred to as S1 = f(<shared secret>, mTAN-code). A re-authentication with a one-time 
code that is distributed with an SMS can also be used as a “fallback solution”8 at any time.  
To summarize, our approach uses the following messages to authenticate a user:  
• Initialization: S1 = f(<shared secret>, mTAN-code) 
• Normal login: Sn = f(<shared secret>, Sn-1) 
• Re-synchronization: Sn = f(<shared secret>, mTAN-code) 
                                                 
5 In high-security applications, this is often made offline, i.e. using letter post or similar 
6 Read: “Secret S in session n” 
7 E.g. a hash of the password or a pre-established Diffie-Hellman secret 
8 E.g. in case of de-synchronization where client and server store different Sn-1 due to possible message loss or when the user has lost his mobile device 
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Reference Implementation: DoubleSec 
The approach described in the previous section has been successfully built and implemented in the iPhone application of 
DataInherit9, a data safe service where users can store their most important digital assets (i.e. documents and passwords, 
whereas the mobile app currently provides access to passwords only) in a highly secure manner. To access the service 
with a web browser on a standard computer, we use a two-factor authentication based on mTAN. On the iPhone app, 
we use a concrete version of the said approach and named it “DoubleSec”.    
For security reasons, we are using the Secure Remote Password Protocol (SRP, RFC2945) for the password authentica-
tion in DataInherit. SRP is a “zero knowledge proof protocol” and “SPEKE10-protocol” and as such provides, besides strong 
authentication, a strong shared secret11 during each login.  
This shared secret has – due to its random- and freshness – optimal characteristics for the usage in our proposed scheme. 
The needed function to merge this shared secret and Sn-1 has been chosen to be an HMAC. Putting it all together, com-
putation of Sn in DoubleSec finally works as follows:  
• Sn = HMAC(<SRP-derived shared secret>, Sn-1) 
The figure depicted on the following page shows the login process including DoubleSec as it is implemented in the 
DataInherit mobile application12. To achieve protection from Man-in-the-Middle attacks as mentioned above, we – besides 
using HTTPS – encrypt Sn before transmitting it using the SRP-derived shared secret. This theoretically allows us to use 
said approach in a secure way even over insecure channels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See http://www.datainherit.com for more information 
10 Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange 
11 This shared secret is session-specific and established in a secure manner during login, similar to a Diffie-Hellman key exchange.  
12 Note that K(n) is referred to as “SRP-derived shared secret ‘K’’ in session ‘n’” 
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Security Analysis 
Man-in-the-Middle Attacks 
The approach described in this document is susceptible to Man-in-the-Middle attacks – unless additionally secured as in 
DoubleSec – because an attacker managing to retrieve Sn (which is referred to as Sn-1 in the subsequent session) and 
also the user’s password is able to authenticate further sessions. For increased security, Sn should therefore not be trans-
mitted in plain text. There might be several ways to circumvent this problem:  
• Usage of some sort of challenge-response protocol to prove knowledge of Sn 
• Usage of SSL/TLS 
• Usage of cryptography to secure Sn, see reference implementation on page 4 
Comparison to mTAN 
As mentioned earlier in this document, this new approach can be used to offer services that already use some sort of 
two-factor authentication on the web-channel, e.g. mTAN, on mobile devices. It is therefore necessary that it provides a 
security level comparable to mTAN. In this section, we will discuss some important aspects of this new approach in com-
parison with mTAN.  
Derived from the theory of two-factor authentication, the second login factor should be something the user has or is, as-
suming the first factor is a password, i.e. something the user knows. This requirement is achieved because it is impossible 
(under practical assumptions) for an attacker to calculate Sn without having access to the mobile device, which would be 
necessary to access Sn-1.  
The fact that the mobile app has direct access to the second login factor should not have any impact: The proposed ap-
proach (as well as all other two-factor authentication solutions) intends to secure the user’s account and not the user’s 
device. However, there exists a small difference with respect to the “critical app” on the mobile device13: With our ap-
proach, it is the mobile app itself; with mTAN, it is the SMS app. 
With mTAN, an attacker is able to log in only once if he manages to gain access to the second login factor (i.e. the SMS 
code), assuming he already knows the user’s password. With this new approach, the attacker is able to log in multiple 
times because by gaining knowledge of Sn-1, he will be able to compute Sn as well as Sn+1, Sn+2, … However the next 
time the legitimate user tries to log in, a loss of synchronization will be detected which leads to a re-initialization of the 
user’s mobile and to a change of Sn-1.  
Access control mechanisms provided by the operating system of the mobile device are important for the security of Sn-1 
to prevent other applications from reading this element.  
From a usability perspective, our approach though exceeds mTAN on mobile devices because there is no need for the 
user to manually switch between different applications. Additionally, it has lower operational costs because there is no 
need to send an SMS to the customer for each login attempt.  
Finally, there is one shortcoming of our proposal in comparison to mTAN: Transaction signing/confirmation, which is in-
creasingly used in e-banking solutions, is not possible with this solution.  
To summarize, we conclude that the present proposal – if implemented correctly and given the mobile device operating 
system serves adequate access control mechanisms to secure Sn-1 – provides a similar security level as mTAN. It can be 
used to make services available on mobile devices without reducing the over-all security of that service. 
                                                 
13 Assuming we face a malware trying to gain access to the second login factor 
 7  
Analysis of Alternative Methods 
During the research phase for DoubleSec, we have also performed some analyses of other approaches, in particular:  
• Usage of iTAN14  
• Usage of the device ID (in case of an iPhone) 
• Automatically insert SMS code15  
• DoubleSec: Proposed and implemented solution 
• Usage of mTAN (including user interaction) 
All of them have been analyzed with respect to their strength to mitigate three abuse cases, their capabilities to meet four 
requirements as well as their usability:  
• Abuse case 1: Passive phishing, e.g. by e-mail 
• Abuse case 2: Weak credentials, i.e. weak passwords 
• Abuse case 3: Password re-use, i.e. the user chooses the same password for multiple services 
• Requirement 1: The second login factor (i.e. its value) should change regularly 
• Requirement 2: The next value of the second login factor should be unpredictable 
• Requirement 3: The approach should serve similar security than mTAN 
• Requirement 4: The second login factor should be something the user “has” 
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AC1: Pass ive phishing      
AC2: Weak credentia ls      
AC3: Password reuse      
Req1: Value changes regular ly      
Req2: Next value unpredictable      
Req3: No lowering of security      
Req4: Something “the user has”      
Usabi l i ty      
 
Note that the approach “automatically insert SMS code” has the same rating as DoubleSec. However it could be – de-
pending on the mobile device – impossible to implement it. Moreover, we strongly believe that the user’s SMS messages 
should never be accessible by anything else than the user of the mobile device using the SMS app. Furthermore, Double-
Sec has the advantage that it is not bound to GSM-networks and can therefore also be used over WLAN-networks or on 
devices not supporting GSM-networks (e.g. on an iPod or an iPad with WLAN-access only). 
                                                 
14 Indexed Transaction Authentication Number 
15 I.e. usage of mTAN, but without user interaction 
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Conclusion 
With the growth of the market for mobile apps, the need for strong authentication schemes on mobile apps will increase 
as well. With the approach described in this paper, we have demonstrated the feasibility of an authentication that is both 
strong and easily usable. With transport encryption and the usage of SPEKE-protocols such as SRP – as shown in our ref-
erence implementation called “DoubleSec” – it even works over otherwise insecure channels. 
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